Freedom of Expression and
Choice of Language In a series of important and highly controversial judgments, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down some of these provisions as inconsistent with the guarantees of free expression found both in the entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and also in Quebec's provincial human rights statute. These decisions were generally admired by English Canadians and, not surprisingly, deplored by the Quebec French. In consequence, the government of Quebec used its power under the Charter to derogate from the free expression guarantees, a decision that they may, in retrospect, have regretted. That action quickly polarized public sentiment and was among the factors making it impossible for Quebec to secure the agreement of all the majority-anglophone provinces on constitutional amendments which would have given it more control over its cultural affairs. Perhaps the linguistic division of opinion on the cases was to be expected. More surpris-ing, however, was the political division, for the decisions did not attract much support from liberal and left-wing academics either. They were dis-appointed to see the Court protecting commercial expression and to see it assisting a historically powerful group (English Quebeckers) against a historically weaker one (French Quebeckers) . Groups who are normally friends of free expression were thus surprisingly hostile to the Supreme Court's defense of it in these cases.
Part of the puzzle is explained by the fact that these cases involved commercial signs and that there are many liberals whose commitment to free expression does not reach that far. But it is, I think, quite wrong to let one's views about commercial expression occlude the broader issue here. First, some of the grounds on which Quebec defended its legislation (for instance, that its government enjoyed "democratic legitimacy," i.e. was elected)
would permit the restriction of non-commercial expression as well.
Second, some Quebec nationalists thought -and still think -that the impugned legislation did not go far enough in restricting English. Finally, the will to regulate more broadly was in any case manifest in the proposal of the Montreal Catholic School Again, it would be wrong to punish people for speaking French at home. But the evil here is just that in prohibiting a harmless activity it restricts their personal liberty.
Principles of rationality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty will in such ways often protect language use indirectly, as fallout from their central aims. Free expression plays an independent role only if it enhances these protections, if it
protects language beyond what can be expected from other principles of political morality (Greenawalt, 1989: 9-10) . That is the sort of principle I want to explore here.
I follow Scanlon in regarding an expressive act as "any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more persons some proposition or attitude" (Scanlon, 1972: 206 In contrast, section 2 of the Canadian Charter, like many other human rights documents, casts the net more broadly to catch: "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of press and other media of communication" (Canadian Charter, 1982) . That is, I think, a better way to demarcate the territory. Such unity as exists in the area flows, not from the fact that these are all in some obscure sense forms of "speech," but rather that they are all expressive.
Generally, an act counts as expressive only if it attempts to get others to understand or share some proposition or attitude, if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many" (Mill, 1962: 142) . But, he continued, the restriction of opinion harms not just the individual but the public interest, and it is not just for the sake of a single speaker that we protect expression. To prevent even one person from speaking is wrong, not mainly because of the value of this liberty to her or to him, but because of the contribution it makes to the common good.
Meiklejohn took the public interest justification even further, denying the speaker's interest any independent moral importance at all: "What is essential is not that everyone should speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said" (Meiklejohn, 1960: 26) . Of Course, principles of free expression do not require that everyone should speak; at most they require that everyone has the opportunity to speak or remain silent.
And the connection between what is worth saying and what is
worth protecting is more complex than Meiklejohn allows. We do not want to claim that a speaker's interest in uttering a banal, commonplace ideal should count for little merely on the ground that, having been said before, its contribution to the public interest is slight. Indeed, a single-minded concern that, as
Meiklejohn puts it, "everything worth saying shall be said,"
could easily lead to the violation of what we normally think of as paradigm rights of free expression. We do not believe that only those things worth saying should be permitted to be said nor even that scarce resources should be apportioned among speakers according to how socially valuable their views are.
Moreover, in some cases we do regard it as important that everyone has an opportunity to speak, even if that means that the amount of time devoted to the worthless and the worthwhile is about the same. Meiklejohn thought his argument a democratic one, but the notion that everyone should speak in fact has deep roots in democratic theory, beginning with the classical Greek notion of isogoria. While the public interest is essential to understanding the f ull importance of freedom of expression, there is also an individual interest that cannot be discounted.
II. MEDIUM AND MESSAGE
There is an objection, however, to thinking that choice of There are many interesting and important aspects of these judgments that we need not consider here. What I do want to focus on is the central distinction between medium and message and the use to which it was put. The reasoning seems to have gone something like this:
1. Only expressive acts are candidates for the protection of freedom of expression; 2. A language is nothing more than a content-neutral code;
3. Thus, restricting the choice of language cannot restrict any expressive act. Now I have already endorsed (1) and suggested some of the reasons one might have for protecting such acts, so let us turn to (2). The word "code" which I draw from the judgment is unhappy, suggesting as it does an artificial medium used in place of a natural language. The fact that the same meaning may be borne by a sentence spoken in English and the same English sentence sent over the wire in Morse code would hardly suffice to establish the semantic equivalence of that sentence and its best French translation. There are codes and then there are "codes."
We must take care not to become enchanted with the jargon of some fashionable linguistic theory. The sense in (2) just amounts to this: it is roughly true that anything that can be said in English can also be said in French. But, as we shall see below, the fact that this is only roughly true allowed the Supreme Court of Canada in Ford to reject (2) and the inference drawn from it. That result was not too surprising, for there were plenty of other clouds on the horizon for this distinction, at least as a matter of law.
First, medium of communication is expressly mentioned in the Charter as being included in the guarantees of section 2. It is true that, in that context, the central cases of such media are the press and airwaves, but neither the language of the constitution nor the decided cases inhibits its development by analogy. Even if medium is distinct from message, in at least some cases the Canadian constitution finds reasons for protecting both.
Second, the following words of an earlier Supreme Court judgment suggest a view of language as something more than a content-neutral code:
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential role that language plays in human existence, development and dignity. It is through language that we are able to form concepts; to structure and order the world around us. 5 . Therefore, a flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth.
The conclusion does not follow because a flag can be both a piece of cloth and something more than a piece of cloth. Likewise, a language can be a content-neutral code and something more than a content-neutral code. If the something more makes it expressive, then the fact that it may also appropriately be described as a neutral code cannot change that.
To be still more precise, we do not even need to show that language is something more than a neutral code in order to justify the protection we want to accord it. Even if it were true that a natural language is nothing but a neutral code, and even if restrictions on language would not restrict the potential audience, the argument given above would still be invalid. For consider:
6. Choice of language is a candidate for protection of free expression only if it is an expressive act;
7. Language is nothing more than a neutral code;
8. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to choose language of expression.
Even if (7) were true, (8) would still not follow, for (8) is about choice of language, and not about language itself. The error thus lies not just in the arguable falsehood of (7), but in an equivocation between "language" as an abstract entity and "choice of language" as an act. Invoking again our earlier analogy, we might compare:
9. Waving a flag is a candidate for protection of free expression only if it is an expressive act;
10. A flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth;
11. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to wave a flag.
Here, the fallacy is patent, for the supposed truth of (10) plainly has nothing whatever to do with (11). A flag, like a language, is not an act of any kind, let alone an expressive one. But speaking a particular language, like waving a flag, is indeed an act and very possibly expressive. Thus, the purported distinction between medium and message is irrelevant. The fact, if it be one, that medium and message are two different things does not even begin to show that choice of medium cannot be intended to convey a message. The argument we are pursuing is a normative one, but it does depend on certain social facts. It fails unless it actually is the case that language use has a social or individual meaning.
This cannot be established a priori. But at least in Canada there is plenty of evidence that in many contexts it does. As I said earlier, the expressive function of language was not missed even by the legislators. The Charter of the French Language begins, "Whereas the French language, the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity.
. . ." 6 What is distinctively nationalistic here is merely the suggestion that a group of people who are only "in the majority" francophone constitute "a people." The reality in a pluralistic society is that language choice permits each people to express its identity. The way this is done is largely a social creation, governed by convention, context and history. That repression was unjust, but it was not ill-informed:
use of those languages was indeed a political act.
Here again, the consequences of requiring the use of a certain language are likely to differ from those of prohibiting the use of others. The decision not to use a particular language may in some circumstances be expressive: it may be an act of resistance. In other cases, it may be understood that to use a particular language is not necessarily to identify with the ethnic group whose language it characteristically is, nor to endorse any political view. A language may simply be, and be understood to be, a lingua franca. More-over, the burden of required use may be partly alleviated by the division of labor. Organizations like companies and bureaucracies may have the power to arrange their affairs so that, for example, only those willing to use English must do so.
And where the regulations apply directly to individuals, they often do so only for limited contexts and purposes. This is not to deny that required use is ever onerous. When language has become politically charged with the burden of nationality, use of language is almost inevitably an expressive act. Both prohibitions and requirements on use limit that expression, though generally in different degrees.
Unlike the semantic thesis, the expressive thesis is pervasive: the use of a language may have an expressive function without regard to subject matter. The sign in Valerie Ford's shop had a social and political significance quite apart from its semantic content. Indeed, Quebec nationalists have often correctly noticed that the use of English by merchants is not purely a matter of commercial expediency but is in part a collective non placet, sometimes even a political provocation. To denounce it in one breath and then in the next defend prohibitions on English on the ground that they merely regulate a neutral code is either blindness or hypocrisy.
Since this expressive character may break out at any point, even on a commercial sign, there seems to be no way one might adopt narrower protections to serve the same ends. Unlike the instrumental argument, the expressive argument is capable of supporting broader principles. The strongest objection to this argument is rather different. It is that the interests at stake are not sufficiently weighty or general to warrant holding others dutybound to protect them or disabling them from infringing them. Is that a credible position? The power of ethnicity and nationality in organizing personal identity, the widely felt need for rootedness, and the structuring power of culture all suggest that identification with an ethnic group may be a substantial human good.
Expressing such identification is good to the extent that it constitutes, reinforces and adapts it.
Perhaps one might object that these interests, though powerful, are purely private. A follower of Chafee, for example, might be tempted in that direction. He saw the underlying values of free expression to be these:
There is an individual interest, the need of men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.
9 (Chafee, 1964: 33) Ignoring the social interest, Chafee thought, leads people systematically to underestimate the importance of free speech. (Mill, 1962 Nor does it apply to small businesses of less than four employees, to publicity for the cultural activities of non-French ethnic groups, or to business specializing in foreign or ethnic goods. 2. The qualification is necessary because an act can try to get others to share a belief in some other way. If A wants B to think it is cold in the room, A can achieve this communicatively, e.g. by telling B that it is cold, or non-communicatively, e.g. by opening a window and making B cold. The second does not require for its success that B recognize A's intention in opening the window, and thus is not a communicative act in the sense under discussion here. 3. Alexander Meiklejohn, for instance, thought that speech should be protected only when it can be reliably thought to promote selfgovernment. Thus it excludes commercial radio broadcasts: "The radio, as we now have it, is not cultivating those qualities of taste, of reasoned judgment, of integrity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force for breaking them down" (Meiklejohn, 1960: 87) . What would he have thought of comic books, pop music, or television? 4. There is in fact a complication in the judgment, for while the above passage suggests that choice of language is protected because regulation of language is regulation of content, the Court also says that the reference in s. 2 to freedom of "thought,"
"belief," and "opinion" shows that the Charter's protections go beyond what it calls "mere content," or at least "content of expression in its narrow sense."
5.
Cf. Kopyto per Corry, J.A., at 226: "Hyperbole and colourful, perhaps even disrespectful language, may be the necessary touchstone to fire the interest and imagination of the public to the need for reform, and to suggest the manner in which that reform may be achieved." Per Goodman, J.A., at 259: "The expression of an opinion which may be lawfully expressed in mild, polite, temperate, or scholarly language does not become unlawful because it is expressed in crude, vulgar, impolite, or acerbic words." 7. The context-dependence of meaning provides an illustration of the limits of abstract argument in political philosophy. One cannot resolve these issues solely by appeal to our concepts of 'expression,' 'language,' etc. It is no thesis of mine that choice of language is always, universally, or necessarily protected by principles of free expression. I am merely trying to identify cases in which it is. Does this need to attend to context suggest that language is ill-suited for protection by constitutionally entrenched rights? I make no claims about that here: the question turns on the nature of rights, and on moral and institutional arguments for putting certain matters beyond the reach of ordinary politics. The issues are well-known. But I might note one general point. One might object that, in view of the social character of our interests in language, it must be an inappro-priate matter for rights, for they only protect individuated interests. The objec-tion is too hasty, for it elides a number of interestingly different ways in which interests may fail to be fully individuated. For example, individuals may have rights to certain collective goods. See, Green (1991) and cf. Reaume (1988) . 8. Political affirmation is often but not always coincident with ethnic identification. Some bilingual Canadians use their second official language in post offices or at border crossings in order to make a political statement without thereby intending to express any sense of ethnic identification with the other group. 9. The passage refers to the interests protected by the First Amendment to the American Constitution, but there is no evidence that Chafee thought that there were any important expressive interests not protected by that document.
